

IRAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION?



OCTOBER 2022

CONTRIBUTORS:

BARRY ROSEN
AMBASSADOR [RET.] YORAM ETTINGER
PROFESSOR GAWDAT BAHGAT
AMBASSADOR [RET.] ROBERT HUNTER
PROFESSOR NATIVIDAD CARPINTERO-SANTAMARIA

EDITORS:

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER
PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR.



INTER - UNIVERSITY CENTER
FOR
TERRORISM
STUDIES

INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR
TERRORISM
STUDIES



Educators
Advisors
Publishers

NOTICES

In view of Iran's escalating security challenges in the Middle East and beyond as well as Israel's covert and overt defense strategies, can a major regional war be prevented? An inter-disciplinary panel of U.S. and foreign experts discussed past lessons, current risks, and prospects for renewed diplomatic negotiations.

Video of the full conference may be found here: [LINK](#).

DISCLAIMER:

Please note that the editors and contributors cannot be held responsible for any errors and consequences arising from the use of the information contained in this publication. Also, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the academic institutions associated with this report.

"IRAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT-RESOLUTION?"

© 2022 Yonah Alexander, Director - Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies

All Rights Reserved.

No part of this work may be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, translated, or adapted in any form or by any means, aspect as permitted by law, without the written permission from Yonah Alexander.

FURTHER INFORMATION AND PERMISSION MAY BE REQUESTED FROM:

Yonah Alexander
Email: YAlexander@potomac institute.org

IRAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT-RESOLUTION?

EDITORS:

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER
PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR.

CONTRIBUTORS:

BARRY ROSEN
AMBASSADOR (RET.) YORAM ETTINGER
PROFESSOR GAWDAT BAHGAT
AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT HUNTER
PROFESSOR NATIVIDAD CARPINTERO-SANTAMARIA

OCTOBER 2022

IRAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT-RESOLUTION?

<u>TABLE OF CONTENTS</u>		<u>PAGE</u>
I.	PREFACE: Professor Yonah Alexander Professor Don Wallace, Jr.	4
II.	SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS:	6
III.	CONTRIBUTORS' PRESENTATIONS: Barry Rosen Ambassador (Ret.) Yoram Ettinger Professor Gawdat Bahgat Ambassador (Ret.) Robert Hunter Professor Natividad Carpintero-Santamaria	9
IV.	QUESTION AND ANSWER DISCUSSION	19
V.	ABOUT THE EDITORS	25
VI.	ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS	25

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER AND PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR.

I. PREFACE

The rise of power in Iran of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the November 1979 seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran and of some 60 American hostages by “revolutionary students” triggered a flurry of introspection in Washington concerning the policies which successive Administrations had followed with a country of enormous strategic and economic importance in the Middle East.

Among the questions that have been raised during that historical period were the following: What had gone wrong? Why had the United States failed to correctly assess the strength of the elements that brought down the Shah Shahanshah, King of Kings, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in January 1979, after a 37-year rule? Why had the United States linked its fortunes so closely to those of the Shah in the first place? What did the national interests of the United States consist of as applied to Iran? What were the full implications of the transformation of Iran from a friendly ally to a hostile adversary of the United States?

These and related issues were analyzed in a study on The United States and Iran: A Documentary History, co-edited by Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes and published by the University Publications of America in 1980. This work was prepared in association with the World Power Studies Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.

During the next 43 years, extensive research efforts have been undertaken by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS) and its academic partners such as the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (PIPS) and the International Law Institute (ILI), focusing on Iran’s strategic and tactical intentions, capabilities, and actions. For instance, Tehran’s expanding terrorism role was discussed within the framework of the study, Terrorism: As State-Sponsored of Covert Warfare, co-authored by Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander and published by Hero Books in 1986.

This work was prepared in cooperation with the Center of Strategic and International Studies at the request of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate. The publication underscored the fact that the goal of psychological terror and physical violence employed by totalitarian dictatorships, like the Iranian regime, is to maintain control of their own people and to expand this kind of control over other regions and nations. In the face of Iran’s terrorism challenge, the United States, its friends and allies, particularly Israel, have developed a wide range of countermeasures. They consisted inter alia of intelligence, economic and security assistance, political and diplomatic pressures, economic sanctions, clandestine counter-terrorism infiltrations, covert and overt military operations.

Despite these activities, Tehran continued to resort to terrorism at home and abroad. Additionally, Iran’s apparent vision of a country becoming the dominant power in the Middle East had led its leadership to develop a nuclear program in open defiance of United Nations resolutions. In this connection, the IUCTS once again had conducted a major research project resulting in the release of a study on The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East. This book, co-authored by Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, was published by Praeger Security International in 2007. It documented Ahmadinejad’s background and rise to power and explained the structure of the Iranian Revolutionary government—the competing centers of power and the major players. The study then detailed the terrorist groups funded and armed by Iran, primarily Hizballah and Hamas. It also provided a comprehensive picture of Iran’s apparent aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as the related implications for regional and global security concerns.

Moreover, numerous seminars and conferences related to the multiple Iranian security challenges to the international community were held in the United States and abroad. For example, on December 6, 2011, a Forum was organized by the IUCTS on “Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Final Warning?” The event highlighted Tehran’s nuclear weapon program amidst the backdrop of an uncertain political reality in the Middle East.

The latest relevant IUCTS event was held virtually via Zoom conferencing on June 30, 2022, and focused on “Iran’s Security Challenges and Prospects for Conflict-Resolution?” The Forum began with opening remarks by Professor Don Wallace Jr. and was moderated by Professor Yonah Alexander. The following invited distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners included; Barry Rosen (hostage survivor of the 1979 takeover at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran); Ambassador (Ret.) Yoram Ettinger (Former Minister of Congressional Affairs at the Embassy of Israel in Washington, DC and Current President of America-Israel Opportunities, Ltd); Professor Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study); Ambassador (Ret.) Robert Hunter (Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO); and Professor Natividad Carpintero-Santamaria (Professor at the Polytechnic University of Madrid [UPM] and General Secretary of the Instituto de Fusión Nuclear “Guillermo Velarde”).

Hopefully, this report might stimulate further public discourse, studies, and policies on critical security issues, including combating terrorism, preventing WMD proliferation, and advancing the cause of peace with justice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

On a personal note, Professor Alexander wishes to express his deep appreciation for the decades-long academic and professional partnerships with the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the International Law Institute; Thanks are due particularly to PIPS’s Dr. Jennifer Buss (CEO), General Al Gray (USMC (Ret.), Chairman of the Board), and Gail Clifford (VP for Financial Management & CFO). Likewise, he is most grateful to the ILI’s Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Chairman) with special thanks to the ILI internship team: Mitchell Knight (University of Wisconsin Madison); Will Murdoch (Brigham Young University); and Emma Samaniego (Santa Clara University). Cover Design by Jason Everett.

Thanks are also due to the IUCTS internship program coordinated by Kevin Harrington. The internship team includes: Adrik Bagdasarian (James Madison University); Benjamin Bermann (University of Chicago); William Brooks (George Washington University); Louisa Burch (American University); Matthew Dahan (the American University); Joshua Isaiah Horton (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill); Xiang Ji (Brown University); Grace Johnson (University of Texas at San Antonio); Harrison Kopitsch (American University); Jinhua Li (Johns Hopkins University); Claudia Rodriguez Loys (University of Miami); Jasmine Massey (George Washington University); Royon Meerzadah (Carnegie Mellon University); Elizabeth Miller (George Washington University); Avgustina Peycheva (Moscow State Institute of International Relations, PhD); Evan Rohe (University of Kent); Evan Talit (George Washington University); and John Watters (Colby College).

II. SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS [DRAWN FROM THE FORUM'S PARTICIPANTS]

1. The legacy of the Iran Hostage Crisis is a general dehumanizing of Iran and Iranians and Persian culture by many observers of Iran, whether policymakers, the media, or others.
2. Improvement of U.S.-Iran relations soon is unlikely.
3. Tehran's violation of human rights via hostage-taking or other actions has been a success, and they use it as a part of their diplomacy toolbox for internal issues, as well as externally.
4. The IRGC conducts hostage-taking and many other forceful acts in the name of Iran for leverage in negotiations, etc.
5. Dual-citizenship holders are potential victims in Iran since Iran does not recognize dual citizenship.
6. Over the last decade, hostage-taking has revolved around issues of international security, specifically the JCPOA.
7. While conducting the nuclear deal, hostage-taking has been put on the table. It is assumed that the practice will have to stop in order to conduct proper negotiations.
8. The patchwork policies of Western countries have failed to stop hostage-taking, and many hostages remain in Iran's prisons to this day.
9. Unfortunately, affected nation-states continue to negotiate with Iran individually, sacrificing leverage they could exert if they acted in diplomatic concert instead.
10. Negotiating with Tehran on a case-by-case basis can yield some results, although more often than not at a steep cost.
11. In attempts to negotiate the end of hostage-taking of dual-citizenship persons, Iran has committed torture and has even set out to execute them. Negotiating for the release of dual hostages on an individual basis only emboldens the regime.
12. The West must be firm in front of Iran in order to prevent hostage-taking.
13. In the days leading up to the Iranian revolution, flawed American intelligence led to the hostage crisis and diplomatic disaster.
14. The American government repeatedly signaled to Iran that it would use only diplomacy and not military might have enabled it to behave as poorly as it has.
15. As America's number one enemy, Iran has influenced and exported anti-Americanism all over the world, even in Latin America where drug cartels and autocratic regimes are inexplicably tied to the Ayatollahs.
16. Many Middle Eastern migrants are peaceful, but a sufficient number are supporters of the regime and can be partially held accountable for extremism and crime in South America.
17. The focus in South, Central, and Latin America for the Ayatollahs is creating opportunity in what they logically perceive as the soft underbelly of the United States. Similar to their operations in the Middle East, the Ayatollahs are using tunnels to smuggle drugs and equipment.
18. The systemic adherence to only diplomacy by the United States since 1979 has been an asset to the Ayatollah regime and self-destructive for U.S. policy.
19. The Ayatollah regime has a track record of sticking to their fanatic expansionist goals, and persisting with the same mentality does not make sense whether you are a Republican or a Democrat.

20. The Ayatollah's vision has its roots in the ancient divide between Sunni and Shiites and is entrenched in their desire to wipe out Sunni 'apostate' states in the Middle East region.
21. Regime change and military options should be on the table to get rid of the Ayatollah regime that is in Tehran.
22. Iran is not a superpower and is not realistically capable of harming the United States or its interests in different regional theaters such as Latin America.
23. Economic sanctions and a large amount of political pressure from the U.S. and its allies have not succeeded in changing Iranian policy. The U.S. and allied failure to pressure Iran economically is illustrated by the fact that Iran's economy is still growing.
24. The U.S. has repeatedly failed to institute regime change and their attempts to do so usually create instability throughout the Middle East.
25. The U.S. is interested in peace and will continue to be engaged in the Middle East, even while it postures to contest foreign powers in other regional theaters.
26. Iran uses asymmetric warfare methods to militarily compete with other regional actors. Iran's reliance on asymmetric warfare methods makes the U.S. policy of funding allies' conventional warfare capabilities somewhat inefficient.
27. Iran is not as isolated as the U.S. portrays it to be. For example, the Islamic Republic has good relations with Qatar and Oman.
28. Realistically, Iran is here to stay, meaning that the Arabs, Israelis, and Turks need to diplomatically and economically integrate Iran into regional affairs in order to secure a lasting peace.
29. No state in the Persian Gulf region should possess nuclear bombs.
30. The U.S. will not necessarily adopt every position that Israel has, but its support to the security of Israel is unimpeachable.
31. Counterterrorism is another major U.S. interest. Most Middle Eastern terrorism is Sunni, which has been backed by money from the Saudis.
32. Continuing the flow of oil has been and remains an interest of the United States.
33. Neither Iran nor the United States did what was necessary to leverage the JCPOA as a means to change the nature of their relationship.
34. A number of American allies were against the JCPOA. However, pulling out of the JCPOA was a mistake by the Trump Administration.
35. President Biden, following the Trump Administration, had the chance to remove Iranian sanctions imposed back when the JCPOA was enforced, but has not negotiated this yet.
36. Removing sanctions would challenge Iran to react and lay the groundwork for a potential relationship between Iran and the U.S.
37. Throughout Western Europe, many perceive the rise of inflation as a consequence of sanctions imposed on Russia for their actions against Ukraine.
38. The origins of Iran's nuclear program can be traced back to the 1950s in connection with President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative in 1953.
39. The JCPOA was an effective agreement because it allowed the IAEA to verify and inspect Iran's nuclear activities. Moreover, the JCPOA produced positive results as illustrated by the agreement's ability to persuade Iran to comply with the rules and regulations laid out by the agreement since 2015.

40. Today, Iran is enriching uranium at the Natanz nuclear power facility which according to the JCPOA should be up to 3.67% and building a new nuclear power plant (Bushehr II) that will be operational in 2024.
41. The West must negotiate with Iran because not doing so will heighten instability and the potential for a major regional conflict.
42. The European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are the primary actors interested in a prompt solution to save the Iran nuclear deal.
43. The European Union Commission supports the renewal of the deal because of the extensive time frame it took to complete the JCPOA as well as the positive impact the deal had on curtailing Iran's nuclear development.
44. The European Union Commission completed the first phase of a larger project with the Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority last April that runs until 2027.
45. The European Union believes the relationship with Iran should be pursued multilaterally.
46. Several Middle Eastern countries seek to use nuclear energy for the process of desalination, especially since seas in the Middle East contain an incredible volume of salt.
47. There needs to be effective monitoring of nuclear facilities in order to emphasize in-depth security and to create a nuclear culture of international and regional cooperation.
48. China and especially Russia have played integral roles in supplying Iran with critical technology and material needs including uranium.
49. The present war in Ukraine should not adversely affect negotiations and Iran's readmittance into JCPOA.
50. Peaceful coexistence in the Middle East is an unrealistic scenario.
51. Ayatollah Khomeini used anti-communist rhetoric to assure American diplomats that he would be peaceful.
52. According to the Iranian nuclear archives seized by Mossad, Iran never intended to limit their nuclear program.
53. Iran took advantage of the benevolent nature of many Western countries.
54. Moral equivalence between the U.S. and Iran is foolish.
55. If one wants to see what Iran will do, look to its past actions.
56. There is consensus in Israel among the left and right-wing that negotiations are not the correct way to deal with Iran.
57. The United States must take a larger, active role regionally with Iran and make it clear that military options are on the table.
58. The belief of U.S. foreign policy establishment of peace is benevolent but misguided, as has been the case in the past with Saddam Hussein and Bashar Al-Assad.
59. At times, Western policymakers mistake their eagerness to achieve peace over the realities that are frustrating, inconvenient, and potentially violent.
60. The Ayatollah's treatment of the people within Iran is also an issue, and it is important to note that the vast majority of Iranians do not support the Ayatollah.
61. The potential for military action could come with a severe cost, but nothing as large as the cost of a potentially nuclear Iranian regime.

62. The combined military power of the United States and Israel would be no match for Iran.
63. Middle Eastern policymakers often fixate on historical events and grudges. Instead, regional peace will result from pragmatic approaches to create a more equitable and prosperous future.
64. Iran is motivated by pragmatic concerns (e.g., the economy) rather than ideology, and Western policymakers should realize this.
65. There remains a possibility to establish a nuclear-free Middle East, but Israel's position on nuclear weapons is inimical to anti-proliferation.
66. There is an emerging "new world order," where the U.S. is not a hegemonic power but a leader of a bloc (alongside China and Russia, which lead their own blocs). Middle Eastern countries are currently choosing how to align themselves in a multipolar world.
67. To rebuild the JCPOA and beyond, progress must be based on types of power and the relationships of power.
68. The U.S. seeks to neutralize the Iranian threat, as the threats of Russia and China are considered of greater importance.
69. American support for Israeli security will not change, but there is a 'growing reluctance' as the U.S. does not want to be involved in an Iranian war.

III. CONTRIBUTORS' PRESENTATIONS

This section of the Report consists of presentations made by the contributors at the Special Forum: "Iran's Security Challenges and Prospects for Conflict-Resolution?" that was held on June 30, 2022 via Zoom conferencing. Some updates and revisions were made by the invited participants.

BARRY ROSEN

Hostage Survivor of the 1979 Takeover at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran

Thank you, Professor Alexander, for inviting me to your Forum, "Iran's Security Challenges and Prospects for Conflict Resolution."

I'd like to preface my remarks today with a reflection on the general dehumanizing of Iran and Iranians as well as the Persian culture by many observers of Iran, whether policymakers, the media, or others. That is the legacy of the Iran Hostage Crisis. While I don't see any improvement in U.S.-Iran relations soon and my remarks today are highly critical of the Islamic Republic, it is my hope that we can always separate the regime in Tehran from its people and civilization.

In my remarks about some of the lessons, I have learned about one of Iran's security challenges: its use of hostage diplomacy for the last 43 years. Some of what I say about Iran may be contextualized when speaking of other nations that exercise hostage-taking.

1. Tehran has been able to succeed in perpetrating its violation of human rights, not only in its domestic politics, but also internationally because it sees one of its tools in its foreign policy toolbox--hostage diplomacy--as a success ever since it embarked on it in 1979. No matter whether it is led by the so-called hardliners or moderates, it carries out hostage-taking and does so, knowing it is an international pariah but yet acts as if it were victimized by the world order.
2. The act of hostage-taking is carried out by the IRGC, the Revolutionary Guards, in concert with the Revolutionary Courts and specific judges, who hold closed trials--by the way, a tradition of the Pahlavi courts--that try dual-nationals, whether American or European, on charges of conspiring with either the United States or Israel to overthrow the regime, tout signed forced confessions, and sentence them to years of imprisonment in Evin Prison, where the victims are used as pawns in political negotiations with the West.
3. The selection of victims is hard to discern, but we do know that Tehran does not recognize dual citizenship, and this means that any dual citizen visiting parents or close relatives in Iran is a potential victim. In most cases, there is no means of consular representation, leaving the hostages open to further torture and repression, always looking to their family, and inevitably to their naturalized host countries, whether in the United States or Europe, to secure their freedom.
4. Over the last decade, the hostage-taking has revolved around issues of international security, specifically the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear negotiations, or more prosaically, bilateral relations for example, the UK's long-standing reluctance to pay the Islamic Republic back for the sale of military equipment that was never delivered.
5. Though U.S. Special Envoy Robert Malley and his European counterparts appear to express genuine concern for the hostages, their fate still seems to be regarded, at best, as an add-on to the nuclear file. But Malley did reveal the connection between Iran's hostage-taking and the nuclear deal when he said, "it is very hard for us to imagine getting back into the nuclear deal while innocent Americans are being held hostage." He added that the crisis of dual citizens held hostage by the Islamic Republic has "our full attention."
6. It would be a tragic mistake to narrow our focus on resolving the threat of Iran's nuclear ambitions. The hostage issue is part of that equation and we need to see the same degree of attention and urgency that is given to the nuclear file put on the range of Iran's other malign conduct.

7. The patchwork policies of Western countries have failed to stop hostage-taking. Tehran should be confronted with a multilateral effort and a comprehensive Iran policy. Should the piecemeal approach continue instead, and the hostages' fate be allowed to be kept separate from the nuclear talks, it will confirm Iranian leaders' belief that Western talk about human rights is just talk—and that there is little price to pay for Tehran's hostage diplomacy.

8. Finally, recent weeks have provided a tale of two hostages, and with that, a sharp lesson in the downfall of approaching Iran's human rights abuses with anything other than complete international unity.

I'd like to relate what recent weeks have taught me about a go-it-alone approach when confronting a regime that plays by its own rules.

It is a tale of two hostages and, with that, a sharp lesson in the downfall of approaching Iran's human rights abuses with anything other than complete international unity.

As many as two dozen dual-national citizens, including five Americans and fifteen Europeans, remain in captivity in Iranian prisons- a total violation of international law.

At the beginning of this year, I undertook a hunger strike in Vienna with the aim of convincing negotiators at the ongoing nuclear negotiations to push for a comprehensive end to Iran's hostage diplomacy. I was joined by others who took up the mantle when my body gave way. We ultimately gained significant media attention and successfully pressured negotiators to engage with us and, in some cases, commit to addressing the issue.

Unfortunately, however, affected nation-states continue to negotiate with Iran individually, sacrificing leverage they could exert if, instead, they acted in diplomatic concert. They are also damaging their own standing by tacitly acknowledging Iran's deplorable use of hostage diplomacy as an acceptable tactic in international relations.

Negotiating with Tehran on a case-by-case basis can yield some results, although more often than not, at a steep cost. For example, the most high-profile dual national hostage of recent years, Nazanin Zaghari Ratcliffe, was finally released in March, after six years of captivity and abuse, but only after the UK government agreed to repay almost \$400 million of debt to Iran.

Two weeks ago, Ms. Ratcliffe revealed that her release was only secured after she was forced to sign a false confession by the Iranian government, a final act of humiliation that the UK Foreign Office was allegedly complicit in by encouraging her to capitulate.

In the end, negotiating for the release of dual hostages on an individual basis only emboldens the regime.

The latest victim of this self-reinforcing cycle is Dr. Ahmad Reza Djalali, a Swedish-Iranian disaster medicine expert who was arrested by the regime on spurious charges in 2016. Since then, he has been sentenced to death on charges of "cooperation with a hostile government," that is, Israel.

Zaghari-Ratcliffe's freedom was bought by the UK government on March 16, 2022. And only weeks later, Djalali nearly paid the price of Britain's decision to reward Iran's despicable behavior.

Eager to punish the Swedish government for daring to host the trial of Hamid Nouri, an ex-Iranian jailer accused of playing a key role in Iran's 1988 prisoner massacre—an emboldened Tehran announced that Djalali would be executed imminently, without further appeal.

A provisional execution date of May 21st was only barely staved off last month, following an outcry from countless human rights advocates. Still, the regime is unlikely to preserve his life for much longer if Sweden does not relent.

While his execution may have been postponed, Djalali has been systematically starved and tortured by prison guards and is believed by those who have had contact with him to be on the verge of death.

If Tehran wants to benefit from sanctions relief and to have an opportunity to rebuild the economy it has brought to its knees through kleptocratic mismanagement, then freeing all dual-national citizens currently locked away inside its prison system should be a fundamental prerequisite of the flagging negotiations in Vienna.

Even with new intelligence of Iran's latest and biggest effort to build a new nuclear facility to ratchet up the nuclear threat to gain concessions, the West must present a united front in Vienna, which is the best chance of achieving our imprisoned citizens' freedom, and freeing other dual nationals from the fear of future imprisonment.

We owe this much to Zaghari-Ratcliffe, who was forced to compromise her honor. And we owe it to Ahmad Reza Djalali, for his suffering.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) YORAM ETTINGER

Former Minister of Congressional Affairs at the Embassy of Israel in Washington, DC
Current President of America-Israel Opportunities, Ltd

If we go back to the end of 1978, the fall of the Shah of Iran, and January 1979, before Ayatollah Khomeini took over control on February 1, 1979, we should pay attention to the policy of the United States towards the new regime in Iran. President Jimmy Carter expressed it very lucidly when he stated ten days before the return of Ayatollah Khomeini from exile in Paris to Tehran. When President Carter addressed a group of global leaders in the islands of Guadalupe, he stated that according to the best sources of American intelligence, the CIA, the world could rest assured that Ayatollah Khomeini would be preoccupied with tractors, not with tanks. The U.S. Ambassador to Tehran, William Sullivan, sent a number of telegrams to Washington, reassuring Washington, based on his own contact with sources close to Khomeini, that Khomeini was going to be an Iranian edition of Gandhi. Sadly, that was the U.S. policy that provided a tailwind to the takeover of Iran by the regime of the Ayatollahs and literally stabbed the back of the Shah of Iran, facilitating the rise and takeover by Khomeini by pressuring the pro-American military of Iran not to interfere. Iran was transformed from Iran to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and from the "American Policeman of the Gulf" to the number one enemy of America in the Middle East, and I would venture to say beyond.

We've seen that U.S. policy, which can be described as a diplomatic option, is sustained until this very day. The U.S. has waived officially, formally, and publicly the regime-change option/military option and made it very clear to the apocalyptic, fanatic rogue regime in Tehran that it will be limited to the diplomatic option. When you deal with a rogue, apocalyptic regime by removing the military club from above the head of the rogue partner in the negotiation, the question is: how badly are you going to lose? Moreover, when we examine the track record of the Ayatollahs' regime from February 1979 until this very day, it has been a systematic, rogue track record that has transformed Iran into the major epicenter of anti-American terrorism, subversion, civil wars against pro-American, Arab Sunni regimes and the proliferation of terrorism, drug trafficking, and of ballistic technologies and other military technologies to anti-American regimes. Not limited to the Persian Gulf or the Middle East at large but also way beyond the Horn of Africa, North Africa, and West Africa where the Ayatollahs are very well entrenched. In fact, all the way to the whole of Latin America from southern Chile all the way to the U.S.-Mexico border. We've seen that by very well-documented collaboration between the Ayatollahs of Iran and every single anti-American regime in Latin America, which sadly has proliferated throughout the years. Most recently, Colombia has joined the ranks of the anti-American regimes. For the first time, we have a left-of-center, pro-Venezuela, pro-Iran president in Colombia which is probably going to severely undermine the American attempt to constrain Venezuela. Fighting the drug cartels, and fighting terrorism in Latin America. There has been a strong strategic collaboration between the Ayatollahs and the major drug cartels in Mexico, Colombia, and Bolivia. We've seen very strong strategic collaborations with every single terror organization in Latin America and we've seen the Ayatollahs of Iran well entrenched in the tri-border area of Argentina-Paraguay-Brazil. Also, the tri-border area of Chile-Peru-Bolivia. Those trilateral border areas, as we know, have been lawless for decades and a haven for terrorists, drug traffickers, money launderers, and other rogue entities such as the Ayatollahs and their proxies: Hezbollah, the Shiite proxy, and the Sunni proxy, Hamas. Which, have been very well entrenched in Latin America since the early 1980s, leveraging the substantial communities of Lebanese migrants - many of them Shiites. Most of them, obviously, are peaceful people. However, there are a sufficient number of very successful

financially peaceful people, who have become allies of the Ayatollahs and Hezbollah, perpetrating Anti-American actions in Latin America.

The focus of the Ayatollahs in (Latin) South and Central America has been driven by the very logical assumption that Latin America is the soft underbelly of the U.S. Therefore, the strategic collaboration with those anti-American terrorists, drug traffickers, and elected governments in Latin America, the exportation of UAVs by Iran to the region. They supply equipment to build underground tunnels for major drug cartels; the same underground tunnels which were constructed between the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza, which facilitated the smuggling of ballistic systems and other advanced weaponry to Hamas in Gaza. The same equipment has facilitated attempts to build tunnels between Lebanon and Syria into Israel. The Ayatollahs' attempt to do the same thing with the drug cartels between Mexico and the U.S.

The bottom line is that there has been a systematic adherence to the diplomatic option from 1979 until today. From 1979 to today, we have seen the U.S. showering the Ayatollah with diplomatic and financial bonanza, which has been mostly dedicated, not as it was assessed by President Carter for agriculture but, for tanks. While the U.S. has been very busy trying to isolate the Ayatollahs through economic sanctions, the Ayatollahs have entrenched themselves deeper into America's backyard. Namely, the diplomatic option has proven itself to be quite an asset for the rogue anti-American Ayatollahs and quite self-destructive as far as the U.S. is concerned. They have quite a track record since 1979. Logically speaking, it does not matter whether you are a hawk or a dove, a Republican or a Democrat, it does not make sense to persist with the same policy which has been quite a bonanza for one of the most anti-American regimes in the world: the Ayatollahs. They have never been driven by despair or frustration but have always been driven by a fanatic vision that has its roots in the 7th century and is being promoted in the Iranian K-12 education system. It is entrenched at Friday services in the mosques and reinforced by commemorating the 680 AD Battle of Karbala: the Sunni-Shiite Big Bang. We have seen the regime adhering to that vision which aims to bring down every "apostate" Sunni regime and bring the Western world, and what they call "The Great American Satan" to submission. This is the regime that has been treated to this very day as a good-faith negotiator. You can be a good faith negotiator or a rogue regime that attempts to subvert and terrorize every single Sunni Arab regime and terrorizes, discriminates, and represses all ethnic and religious minorities in Iran as well as women. You can be that type of rogue regime or you can be a good-faith negotiator. To assume that such a regime is a good faith negotiator is self-destructive and an oxymoron. To conclude, I suggest it is time for the U.S. to bring out of the drawer the very constructive regime-change option or military option if it wishes to rid the Gulf, Middle East, Latin America, and the world at large from the wrath of the apocalyptic regime in Tehran.

PROFESSOR GAWDAT BAHGAT

National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study

Thank you very much, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this very important discussion. To begin, I want to make it clear that I work for the United States government, for the Department of Defense, but everything I will say is my own opinion and does not represent U.S. government policy or the Department of Defense.

My take on Iranian policy is very different from my Israeli colleague's. I believe in policies where there are no permanent enemies or permanent friends, and also, I do not believe Iran is a superpower or has influence in all of Latin America or all over the world. Iran is a major regional power but Iran does not have the capability to threaten the United States from Latin America or from any place else. The United States is *the* "Superpower" and has the capability to deal with any threat. But also, we, the United States, tried to apply maximum pressure on Iran and senior officials in the Biden Administration and many other people confirmed that this maximum pressure policy failed. It failed in many ways: the Iranian economy is growing according to the World Bank and IMF. The Iranian government is in control and talking about regime change like we did in Iraq is a terrible idea. The United States is not good at regime change and regime change brings instability to the entire region. And again, we learn from the example in Iraq- it is better for the people themselves to decide what they want. For Iran and the U.S., as I said, Iran is a major regional power and the United States is a major international global power; the United States has interests in the Middle East. The United States is not withdrawing from the Middle

East. U.S. interests in the Middle East include the security of Israel, oil supplies, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism. The United States will remain engaged in the Middle East.

In the last several years, Iran has developed the capability to establish itself as a major regional power and to challenge the military capabilities of its adversaries including the United States. Basically, Iran developed what is called "asymmetric warfare." Iran has invested heavily in drones, missiles, small speed boats, maritime security, cybersecurity, and this maximum pressure policy of arming neighboring countries is not the right way forward. The United States would like to see stability, political stability, and economic prosperity in the Middle East. The only way to get there is to get the Arabs, the Turks, the Israelis, and the Iranians to talk to each other and together, to figure out how they want to move forward and establish economic trade, diplomatic relations, and so on. President Biden will visit Saudi Arabia and meet with Arab leaders and will meet with Israeli leaders. This shows that the United States will remain engaged in the Middle East, but again, the news about the new negotiations in Doha, Qatar did not go well. We should not give up on diplomatic negotiations. We have to accept that the Islamic Republic is here to stay. We have to forget about regime change. Again, we tried it in many countries and the outcome was very bad for the United States and for countries in the region. We should accept that the Islamic Republic is here to stay and the Iranian people themselves, if they want to reform the system or any change, they will do it without foreign intervention, without American intervention. We should urge our allies: Arabs, Israelis, and Turkey to integrate Iran into the regional system. Iran is not isolated in any way. Iran has friends in the Gulf, Oman, and Qatar, and Iran is speaking to the Saudis in talks that are sponsored by the Iraqi government. The United States should support regional integration and it should be a bottom-up approach, not imposed by foreign alarm, and we should encourage the Israelis and Iranians to de-escalate. Again, in the future, there is no doubt in my mind that the Arabs, the Israelis, the Turks, and the Iranians have always shared the Middle East and have always lived side by side, and all of them will remain neighbors, will continue to be neighbors, and the United States should support a peaceful negotiation, creating a new Middle East where all these four peoples and other minorities learn to live together.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT HUNTER

Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO

Thank you, Yonah. It is always a privilege to be involved in your sessions because they genuinely bring together a lot of different perspectives and go to the heart of the issues. This slot should have been occupied by my wife, Dr. Shireen Hunter. She's the brains of the family, especially on the issues we are discussing today. But, I had COVID early, a few weeks ago. She had COVID late. I've gotten over it. She hasn't, so she has asked me if I can fill in to the extent that I can.

I want to build on what Professor Bahgat said in terms of the overall view of politics and where one needs to be for the long term in the Middle East. I'm going to focus on U.S. interests.

My background: I was the principal author of the Carter Doctrine, for example, in Jimmy Carter's White House, and I've been involved in Persian Gulf issues now since the late 1960s, off and on. One thing about the Middle East – once you get into it, you'll never get out of it. It's a lifetime occupation. You're never unemployed.

The United States has several interests in regard to this region. Number one is no nuclear bombs if possible, *by anybody*, in the Persian Gulf region. And that of course begins with Iran, which is the closest after Israel – whose bomb we have tolerated, with regards to gaining such a capability.

We also have some other major interests, one of which is to preserve the security of the state of Israel. That goes way back even before Israel was created. I've been working on these issues since June 6, 1967, when the Six-Day War began. That American commitment to Israel's security is not just something that is a strategic issue, it's something that goes to the heart of the being of the people in the United States. And that is unimpeachable – the American support for the security of Israel. It does not mean, however, that we will necessarily adopt every position that Israel has or every interpretation. Even if Israel's sense of security implies our doing certain kinds

of things, which, in the United States with various governments, we believe are not necessarily coincident with where we need to be.

Of course, we have other interests as well. Terrorism is very important. The United States talks about it all the time. The NATO alliance in Madrid this week talked about it, including Middle Eastern terrorism – of which Iran has been a participant, but it's not just Iran. At least, up until the hopefulness that has been expressed by President Biden's forthcoming meetings in Saudi Arabia, the leading terrorist regime in the Middle East, in terms of promoting it, has been Saudi Arabia. There is absolutely no doubt about that. Most Middle Eastern terrorism is Sunni, which has been backed by the Saudis with money and inspirational calls over the place. If you want to deal with terrorism, it's not just getting Iran to stop what it's doing. It's getting Saudi Arabia – and there are some other elements of the Persian Gulf involved – to stop it. I hope that is something that Mr. Biden makes absolutely clear to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. We've suffered too long from that. An awful lot of Americans and others have died because of Saudi Arabia. Some Americans have died because of Iran, as has already been pointed out.

A major U.S. interest in the region is the flow of oil. I have been involved in that issue since 1973. There's a basic rule that every country that has oil is going to sell it.

Now we come down to the Obama Administration, which made Herculean efforts to try to deal with the problem of the Iranian bomb. That led to the successful negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA. It was in some aspects, term-limited, but that was, at the time, a lot of years: it's obviously fewer years now.

There was a lot of controversy about the JCPOA, including in the United States Congress, which is one reason it's not a treaty - instead, it's an agreement among a number of countries. The United States and Iran are the principal ones, but there are also other countries – the Europeans, the Russians, the Chinese and the European Union are kind of sitting there on the side.

Unfortunately, neither Iran nor the United States did the things they needed to do in order to use the JCPOA as a means, potentially, to change the nature of their relationship and then change the nature of the behavior of this particular regime - for which I have no time. (I don't know any Americans who really do have any time for it.) One thing to understand is that even though the Iranian ballistic missile program is contained in the agreement, as well as in the UN Security Council Resolution, as something desirable to be dealt with, it was not a requirement in the actual language. Iran soon ran some ballistic missile tests. As for the United States and its part, unfortunately, the day after the JCPOA went into effect, the United States Treasury Department imposed new restrictions on Iran - new sanctions. So you can say that neither side built a lot of trust, based on the JCPOA.

Incidentally, the agreement was fought by a number of America's friends and partners in the region. Saudi Arabia fought it, the UAE fought it, and Israel fought it very intensely - including its prime minister, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, the once-and-maybe-future prime minister. He went as far as to speak to a joint session of the United States Congress and asked members of the Congress to be loyal to the state of Israel and not loyal to the United States president. That has never happened before.

President Trump, for whatever reason, decided to pull the United States out of the JCPOA in 2018, and Iran did the same. From our perspective, that meant instead of the continuation of progress in dismantling most of the Iranian program that had military applications - including getting rid of their nuclear reactor and outsourcing most of their more highly-enriched uranium – the Iranians went back into that business. We lost, and I would argue everybody lost by that. I'll let the Israelis decide for themselves whether they lost from it. Many of us in America would say that this could not possibly have been a good thing for Israel: to increase the risks of an Iranian bomb being built or increasing the risk of a need for Israel (with or without the United States) to attack Iranian nuclear facilities with all the imponderables that would be involved in it. There would be incredible imponderables. The idea of a surgical military operation in Iran is nonsense. We only have to look at what happened in Afghanistan and what happened in Iraq. One has to be a little careful making those judgments.

Obviously, at the point when the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA, there would be no benefits in regard to what else Iran was doing, including in Yemen – though Saudi Arabia was the prime foreign instigator of that. Everybody knows that. When I was in the White House in 1979, we had to deal with Saudi incursions into Yemen, and it

goes all the way back to the Nasser period. So that has been a longstanding Saudi ambition. Of course, the Iranians have ambitions, like in Syria – where, if I were Israeli, I would indeed be deeply worried. With regard to Hezbollah, that was not a problem for Israel until after it invaded Lebanon in 1982. Regarding Hamas, our people judge that the problem is less about Iran than it is with some others – Sunnis – but it is still a problem.

President Biden came into office and on day one reversed many policies of President Trump that he, Biden, judged were not in the best interest of the United States – things done by executive order, but he didn't do that with the JCPOA. In effect, he continued with the policies which were put forward by the former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. The 12-Point Program, if it were implemented, would be a regime change. No country could take that seriously. Pompeo just threw that out there and made things worse; it helped to justify what Trump did. So the idea was, as Biden said during the campaign, along with his campaign people who are now in office, “Why don't we have compliance for compliance?” Except that wasn't the initial position of the Biden Administration. Mutual compliance was fine, it said, provided that Iran moves first. Well, that wasn't going to happen; no country could do that. In fact, many people (and I was one of them) argued that if indeed Biden had simply rejoined the JCPOA, taking us back to where we were with Obama, we would be a lot better off – and so would Israel, for that matter, a point that has been validated since then. Incidentally, Obama paid a heavy political price at home, including with Israel's supporters, for getting this benefit for Israel's security. The JCPOA helped everybody in the region, including Israel.

For example, in January 2021, Biden could have said to the Iranians – and he could still do it today, this afternoon, if he wanted to despite all the negotiations going on: “We will take off the sanctions that were imposed, removing them to the circumstances prior to the JCPOA. Now, you Iranians will have to go back to where you were with your nuclear program where it was when the JCPOA went into force. Either do it or you don't.” And if the Iranians did it, then one could move on from there and try to build other things, deal with other elements of Iranian behavior and overall Persian Gulf security requirements. And if the Iranians didn't do it, you could have snapped back on sanctions. But at least it could have been tested. There were elements, within the Administration and on Capitol Hill, that refused to do that, to give Mr. Biden running room. Some of our friends and partners in the Middle East have hammered at Biden consistently since then not to do that. In fact, those of us who are experienced negotiators don't see that the Iranians have really operated in good faith. But neither has the United States. As I said, for the U.S. just to rejoin the JCPOA has been a very simple thing to do, and then proceed from there. So we are now in a situation where the chances of conflict have gone up, the chances of resolution have gone down, and both sides have dug in their heels at great mutual risk.

Maybe there will be an agreement, or maybe there won't. As I say, there didn't have to be all these complicated negotiations, where internal domestic pressures on both sides seem to be in control. The United States could act, unilaterally. Just do it. Forget about the IRGC and whatever Iran is demanding. Just rejoin the JCPOA, remove those sections that are related to it, and then challenge the Iranians to do what they had agreed to do under the JCPOA.

But in part, because of U.S. domestic politics, *mostly* because of U.S. domestic politics – which are heavily influenced from abroad – the U.S. is not acting in its own self-interest. Without foreign influence, it would be a different picture. So that's what I'm calling for: just rejoin the JCPOA.

Now, where do we go from here? If we do get an agreement, then we have to have some serious conversations with everybody about building some kind of security situation - a security structure, for the future, which Professor Bahgat was talking about, in which everybody has a stake. You can't build a security structure by leaving anybody out, and that includes Israel, includes Turkey, includes Egypt, certainly includes all the Arab states, and needs to include Iran. We're not even where we can consider that step yet until we can get this matter of the JCPOA done, and that ball is in both countries' courts. But unilaterally, the president of the United States could take care of it. For him to fail to do so is a major mistake, in my judgment.

Right now, we're worried about the war in Ukraine. We're imposing sanctions on Russia. One of the things that's causing a real problem in the West is inflation, much of which is based upon sanctions against Russia, including in the oil sector. Maybe some economists say that is not true, but certainly, that's the perception throughout Western Europe. And yet the United States is unwilling to remove sanctions on an increase in Iranian oil exports – beyond what it sells to China, for example – which would almost certainly happen if we rejoined the JCPOA. We

don't even talk about this in public in this country. But more Iranian oil exports on the global market would certainly help us and the Europeans to help keep sanctions in place, which, whatever you heard out of the G7 and the NATO summit, are beginning to unravel. We now have a very short-term unified confrontation against Russia. It's unraveling. So that's an area, a linkage between crisis and conflict in different parts of the world, where the United States is in default of American interests.

PROFESSOR NATIVIDAD CARPINTERO-SANTAMARIA

Professor at the Polytechnic University of Madrid (UPM) and
General Secretary of the Instituto de Fusión Nuclear “Guillermo Velarde”

Professor Alexander, it is very nice to meet you again. Good afternoon to all of you. I have prepared a presentation on nuclear issues, as assessed by the European Union (EU) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran started its nuclear program in the 1950s after President Eisenhower founded the Atoms for Peace Program in 1953 to make nuclear energy available for peaceful applications in other countries. By that time, Iran was aligned with the United States and they planned that Iran could have, by the end of the 20th century, 23 nuclear power plants to supply electricity to the country, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. In 1974, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was created and had under its responsibilities the design, construction, and operation of the plants including both fission and fusion reactor types as well as a research activity for the application for the safety of conducting nuclear reactors in the country through the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority. The AEOI also works in several fields and applications of nuclear sciences for different uses such as medicine, agriculture, industry, etc.

However, the evolution of events went in such a way that, in 1979, the Pahlavi regime fell and thus, started the Islamic revolutionary regime. After 1979, the next 10-15 years were very difficult to find stability for Iran, including a long war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, and the Iranian regime was rather weakened. Thousands of scientists fled during the Islamic revolution to the West, among them nuclear scientists who had been working for the nuclear power plants. The years passed in the post-revolution period, and research on nuclear technology and science underwent a new impulse.

The Bushehr nuclear power plant (BNPP-1) was planned to be built during the 70s, but due to several crises, the building of the plant was stalled. Finally, the Russian Federation and Iran signed a joint nuclear cooperation agreement to finish the construction of the nuclear power plant, which has been working towards producing electricity since 2011. It might be said that the war with Ukraine will not have a special influence on this cooperation aspect. Bushehr II nuclear power plant (BNPP-2) started its construction in 2016 and will be provided with a Generation III reactor. The completion of BNPP-2 is planned for 2024.

After controversial issues in 2003, it seemed that U.S. satellites detected some plants for the enrichment of uranium in Natanz. Afterwards, the Iranian government declared that the Natanz plant was used for the enrichment of uranium for civil purposes. Further controversies and an unstable relationship, including poor diplomatic relations with the United States, led in 2015 to the launch of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that was agreed upon by P5 countries plus Germany and the European Union. (Resolution 2231 adopted by the Security Council).

According to JCPOA:

- 1) Iran will allow IAEA inspectors to monitor its civil centers.
- 2) Iran will rely on light water reactors.
- 3) It will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges.
- 4) Fordow will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology center.
- 5) Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernized heavy water research reactor in Arak using fuel enriched up to 3.67% and will not produce WGP.¹

¹ EU Website. JCPOA restrictive measures. 2022.

The JCPOA has been improved since 2015 with different verifications and physical inspections carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency.² In May of 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed sanctions on Iran.

The European Union Commission accepted the nuclear deal and started cooperation projects with Iran, with the first one being from 2018 to 2020, to support the Iran Nuclear Regulatory Agency in the design and equipment emergency preparedness and response for Nuclear Safety Center (NSC). On April 7, 2022, the European Union completed the first phases of operations with the Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority and in the program, which goes from 2021 to 2027, the European instrument for international nuclear safety cooperation is a section devoted to the Middle East region and one part, especially devoted to the JCPOA program that will contribute to the implementation of the European Union commitments and industry or civil nuclear operations.

Presently, there are several programs to develop nuclear energy in the Middle East. Turkey will likely have operated its first nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, by 2026. In Iran, Bushehr II will probably be ready in 2024 for the production of electricity. Also, in Saudi Arabia two NPPs, Huwayd and Khor Kuweihing will produce nuclear energy for electricity, desalinated water, and thermal energy. The Jordan government wants to deliver nuclear energy to install and to improve electricity connections, and thus Qasr Amra NPP is being developed. Desalination is a costly process that requires large amounts of energy, especially for waters which have a high volume of salt as is the case of the Dead Sea, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf. This is one of the reasons why nuclear energy will be used and developed in the Middle East, and also contribute to environmental sustainability by reducing the carbon footprint derived from the burning of fossil fuels. The development of nuclear energy in the Middle East requires a solid regime of nuclear safety and nuclear security since it is a zone where several threats and challenges meet: geopolitical tensions, non-state actors, terrorist networks, hybrid conflicts, illicit radioactive and nuclear materials trafficking, nuclear proliferation, etc. We have to counteract these threats and challenges by effectively monitoring nuclear facilities and by having an accounting control of the nuclear material by emphasizing in-depth security, and naturally by improving nuclear culture.

Related to the concerns of the European Union, I would like to remark that the European Union considers that the relationship with Iran should be multilateralist in terms of cooperating with all countries in the Middle East to reach a line of peace and stability for the region. For this reason, and according to the high representative of the EU, they consider that presently, the JCPOA nuclear deal is under great pressure on multiple fronts, and he thinks that this plan of action should be preserved for two reasons. The first is because it took many years to get to this agreement. It says as well that results can be achieved by European diplomacy and effective multilateralism. The second reason is that the European Union considers the JCPOA agreement not merely a symbolic success. It has given results and important steps since the signing and it is necessary that it keeps working.

A group of former European Union officials recently sent a letter to the ministry of Iran to inform him that they wish to express their concern about the negotiation and that they would like to restore Iranian compliance with the government and the United States government to go back to negotiations because they are worried that the JCPOA has entered in a situation of non-movement. They consider that it is crucial for international peace and security.

In closing remarks, I would like to say that the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency are the main actors that are interested in a prompt solution to save the Iran nuclear deal. A regression to initial tensions is feared, which would produce a dangerous situation in the search for peace and stability in the Middle East. Finally, and according to the question formulated by Professor Alexander: *Can a major regional war be prevented?* My opinion is that a major regional war can be and should be prevented. It's highly necessary to go back to negotiations, and it's necessary to clarify this situation for the good and peace of all the countries. Thank you very much for your attention.

² IAEA Website. Verification and monitoring in Iran. 2022

IV. QUESTION AND ANSWER DISCUSSION

Selected comments by the contributors to this report during the discussion following the presentations. Some of the invited attendees from the United States and internationally participated during this segment.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) YORAM ETTINGER

The first comment I would like to make is that when I hear the references to getting together and bringing about a Kumbaya-like state of mind among Middle Eastern rival elements, the Iranian Shiites and the Sunni Arab neighbors in the Middle East, and to bring them with Turkey to produce peaceful coexistence, it reminds me of an old country western song. I don't know if participants here are familiar with country western songs, but there was a major country western singer, George Strait, and one of his hits was "I've got some oceanfront property in Arizona, and if you'll buy that, I'll throw the Golden Gate in for free".

This is exactly the Ayatollah's tactic which misled and trapped President Carter and his team, Zbigniew Brzezinski, although he was more hawkish than the State Department establishment, the CIA, and the Pentagon. They all fell for Ayatollah Khomeini's peaceful songs and that he was inherently anti-communist and anti-Soviet and therefore, he would accommodate the Americans; and certainly he had no interest in the exportation of the Islamic Revolution, but was supposedly only preoccupied with domestic issues, with bringing domestic liberty and an enhanced standard of living, all of which had nothing to do with reality.

Anyone who took Middle East 101 should have read the writing on the wall. It was not only written on the wall; it was written in font 44 or font 60. Namely, Ayatollah Khomeini, by definition, and his successors, are committed to this fanatic, apocalyptic vision of taking over the Gulf, taking over the Middle East, global aspirations, and establishing a universal Shiite community. It sounds very illogical to us in the West. But, this is exactly the reality according to the Ayatollahs until this very day. There has been an ongoing attempt, as we've also heard during this Zoom session, an attempt by Westerners to try and export Western values and Western institutions to the Arab and Muslim Middle East. It's similar to a person who is determined to force a river to run from the ocean all the way to the mountaintop.

I wish it would be possible, but we must be realistic. When we talk about realism, part of that realism has been the Iranian nuclear archives that were seized by the Israeli Mossad. Some of it was released publicly, all of it has been shared with the American intelligence community, and it shows in a well-documented manner that they never intended to comply with the JCPOA. They never complied with the JCPOA. They never intended to allow the inspectors to inspect, and it was all wrapped with what I would call screensavers. Screensavers, which have attracted the Western world, especially the European part of the Western world, due to their genuine eagerness to produce peace.

Sadly, this is not what most of the world believes in. This is certainly not what the Ayatollahs of Iran aim at, and last but not least, we've had a track record (of the Ayatollahs), and then I hear about the expectations, and the attempt to apply moral equivalence between the U.S. and the Ayatollahs. Well, the U.S. made some mistakes and the Ayatollahs made some mistakes. Yes, some people drive through red lights. Other people happen to be involved in mass executions and horrendous violations of human rights and terrorism. You cannot apply moral equivalence to those two cases. And in order to project and assess future behavior intelligently by the Ayatollahs, I know of no better way than to rely on their track record, past track record especially. If it's systematic from '79 until June or July 2022, this track record is the best way to assess the future. And, that track record tells us this very, very simply: leopards sometimes change tactics, but they cannot change stripes. The same applies to Ayatollah leopards.

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER

How do you see elections in Israel affecting the short-term outlook on Iran and the Middle East?

AMBASSADOR (RET.) YORAM ETTINGER

One of the very few common denominators among the left and right wing, or Netanyahu anti-Netanyahu, groups in Israel is the consensus that negotiations are the worst way of dealing with the clear and present danger of Iran's Ayatollahs. Not a real and clear danger to Israel alone, but a real danger to the pro-American Sunni Arab countries and to America itself. My greatest concern is not with the Israeli policy towards Iran, but with the United States. One of the underlying assumptions behind the foreign policy establishment in Washington, mostly Secretary of State Blinken, who is the chief architect of Biden's national security and foreign policy, is the cardinal assumption that the introduction of the military option would inflame relations in the Middle East. In my mind, that is similar to a police chief who takes away the club above the heads of law violators and makes it known that from now on it is only negotiation between the police and mobsters, drug traffickers in the area. It would not bode well for the communities in that area. Exactly the same thing applies to rogue regimes. Again, not a rogue regime by speculations, a rogue regime based on a track record since February 1, 1979 and it has become worse and worse in its rogue attitude.

I keep hearing the expectations and hopes - which I have no doubt are driven by benevolent ideas and assumptions - but I am reminded of Ambassador Hunter who was talking about Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein was considered, amazingly and recklessly enough, as an ally by the American foreign policy establishment, because the enemy of my enemy is my friend. How gullible is it to make such an assumption when that enemy can also be my enemy? Certainly, in the case of Saddam Hussein and the U.S., literally, until Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, the State Department was of the opinion that this was an 'intra-Arab affair' not involving the USA. We remember the attitude toward Bashar Assad when he took over, the attitude expressed by the so-called "Wise Men" of Foggy Bottom and the so-called 'Elite' media, especially Tom Friedman of the New York Times and those like him at the Washington Post, LA Times, CNN, etc. They approached Assad as a potential moderate leader because of his background in London and being married to a British woman. Speaking many languages and being the President of the Syrian Internet Society, but reality was very different. It was not a mystery, it was known. It was the same with Yasser Arafat, who was embraced by the Western world, and I am ashamed to say by Israeli leaders as well when there was no real reason to embrace Arafat. As happens to be the case too frequently, Western policy makers decide to sacrifice the frustrating, inconvenient, intolerant, and violent reality on the altar of their desire for peace and wishful thinking. Therefore, Arafat received the Nobel Prize for peace. People do not realize how far you can go being swept by wishful thinking and being frustrated by reality. It is true that a military option is required in the attempt to free the Iranian people from the Ayatollahs. Nobody talks about ignoring the Iranian people. As people here know, the vast majority of Iranian people do not want the Ayatollahs. They are repressed, tortured and hung by the Ayatollahs. Certainly, when we talk about the cost of that, there will be a severe cost. I happen to think the military power of the U.S. and Israel is superior to Iran's. It is like matching an NBA team against a junior high basketball team. Let's assume I am wrong, and it will entail a severe cost. That cost will be dwarfed by the cost of facing a nuclear Iran, which will be the result of the perpetrated, systematic, and diplomatic option. Because a rogue regime will change its tactics but not its spots.

PROFESSOR GAWDAT BAHGAT

I believe that the bottom line is that all of us would like to see peace in the Middle East, but we have some disagreement on how to do it.

And I, as an American, believe the United States is very interested in peace, not only in the Middle East, but around the world. Because it is good for the United States, and it is also in line with our values. And I still have family in Egypt and have dear friends in Israel and many other Middle Eastern countries — both personally and professionally, I would love to see peace. But also, I believe we should not keep talking about the past, and instead, look at how to make the future better.

My Israeli colleagues keep talking about Ruhollah Khomeini, and he died many years ago. Somehow, it reminds me that every time you ask diplomats, or meet with Iranian diplomats, the Iranians keep talking about 1953, history, and how it is very important to focus on the future to make it better for everybody. The Iranians are not

motivated or driven by ideology or Shi'a. No political system, or government can stay in power if it does not meet the economic needs of its people. The Iranian people, like the Israeli people, Arabs, Turks, and the Americans, would like to see jobs, would like to put food on the table, and would like to take care of their families. This is what Iranian policy is driven by; it is not driven by Shi'ism, or ideology, or seventh-century history.

We have to be realistic and talk about the future and about nuclear weapons. Nobody would like to see the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I understand Israel cannot give up its nuclear option. I know there are many good reasons, but there have been efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear weapon free zone. In 1974, Egypt and the U.N. called for making the Middle East a nuclear weapon free zone. My strong belief is, as long as Israel has a monopoly on nuclear weapons, the Arabs, Iranians, and Turks will try to change this, either by trying to make their own nuclear weapons or by trying to invest in chemical and biological weapons. Unfortunately, there is a double standard, and the efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear weapon-free zone have failed. But, we should not give up on this effort.

Finally, there is the violation of human rights in Iran, but also there is a violation of human rights here in the United States and in Israel. The killing of an American-Palestinian journalist was a clear violation of human rights. We all have a long way to go and we should try to work together to improve human rights in every place in the world.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT HUNTER

Just very briefly—I don't know anybody in business in the United States who's trying to do something sensible in American interests and frankly, the interests of some of our partners—including in Israel, where we are the dominant supporter of Israel from our side—who is pollyannaish about this? There needs to be recognition that there are power relationships. Some of them may be ideological, religious, or apocalyptic. We saw that in the years that the Ayatollah and his gang tried to spread his notion, their notion, of Shiism throughout all the Shia communities of central Asia. It didn't work. People didn't want it. They didn't want what the Iranian model had to offer.

That was years ago. So let me go back to my own time as a senior U.S. negotiator in the White House for the Autonomy Talks, when Prime Minister Begin was in office. That was after the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

I worked on autonomy and other matters. It was always with an idea that if there was something to be agreed, it had to be, if not self-enforcing, at least enforceable. One did not ask anybody to take anything on faith: We certainly did not ask Israel to take anything on faith. If there was going to be something that would happen, it would have to be because there were fully effective arrangements. So that, for its part, Israel would feel secure with whatever it was doing. Similarly, we were going to have a JCPOA, which was worked out long and hard by a large number of people, including a lot of people who have very close ties to Israel, as some of us have spent over the years. It was to make sure that whatever was in the JCPOA was going to work for the United States but also for partners in the region, primarily Israel. That's also true for anything that happens in the future. If we're able, for example, to get back to the JCPOA and to try to build things beyond it, it has to be based on facts and relationships of power. It has to be based on self-interest and the capacity to devise things where there would very likely be outside help. Notably, nothing positive in Arab-Israeli relations has ever happened without outside intervention. The one time it was not the United States, it was my good friend, Johan Jørgen Holst from Norway, who did the Oslo Accords.

Any future arrangements have to provide for security, beginning for the United States, and then for our partners. These arrangements, to be workable and to have a chance of succeeding, also have to recognize that Iran, too, has faced security threats from abroad. It's not free of security threats, they happen all the time. It was the country that was invaded in 1980 by Iraq. That war went on for eight years in which the United States supported Saddam Hussein's Iraq in significant part. I'd left the government by then, but I certainly was engaged in a number of things where I saw what was going on.

In fact, it is remarkable, given the British and American overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953 and the hostage crisis of 1979-1981, that there is anything but a totally poisonous and thus inhibiting relationship on both sides. It's remarkable that we're able to deal with the Iranians on the nuclear weapons issue after the hostage crisis and after what we did with Saddam Hussein. If something's going to work in the future, it's going to have to be based on realities—power realities, enforced, or enforceable—not upon, to use Yoram Ettinger's word, "kumbaya." Incidentally, I had the honor of working with Zvi Rafiah at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, who was one of Mr. Ettinger's predecessors there, as well as over the years with a number of other, senior Israeli politicians and negotiators. That included my role in developing Israel's relationship to NATO when I was U.S. ambassador there. I have not yet had the honor of meeting Mr. Ettinger, but I hope that will happen at some point.

PROFESSOR NATIVIDAD CARPINTERO-SANTAMARIA

Since the nuclear crisis started, all Secretary Generals of the IAEA, Drs. Mohammed El Baradei, Yukiya Amano, and present Rafael Mariano Rossi have shown an intense interest in the complying of the terms of the JCPOA. Data and results derived from the signing of the Additional Protocol by Iran, implemented voluntarily, have been made public by means of several reports on the Verification and Monitoring.

I would like to refer to the last Report by the Director General on the last Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). GOV/2022/24 of 30 May 2022 Derestricted 8 June 2022.

Last week there was a meeting in Doha between representatives of the United States and Iran to carry out indirect nuclear talks. According to European Union observers, the meeting was good, but probably, there are still a lot of things to solve.

We now have a new large front open, which is the Russian-Ukrainian war. The war of Ukraine is becoming a worrisome factor to be added to present destabilization in the Middle East. Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen are undergoing deep conflicts with different profiles and an appalling humanitarian crisis. We have to look for a solution and try to find the right way to go back to negotiations and to avoid the nuclear crisis going deeper because none of us wish for a Middle East with more problems and more instability with unpredictable consequences. The world is getting smaller and the European Union is absorbing all these problems, absorbing all these threats, and I think that it's just a question of will for both sides.

PROFESSOR DON WALLACE

Thank you very much, Yonah. Once again, you provided a rather energetic panel. You know, I only have three reflections:

First, picking up on what was said by Professor Bahgat, Iran and the Iranian people are here to stay. We should not forget that. Now, I understand that an Islamic regime is different from a non-Islamic regime, but I just make the basic point. Iran and its people are not only here to stay, but they have been here for thousands of years, and it's just an unavoidable fact.

Second, I am a little puzzled: what should be our policy?

And the third point is this: Given the situation with respect to the world's climate, we are stuck with nuclear energy whether we like it or not, and it is something to keep in mind. I listened to Ambassador Ettinger very carefully. It seems to me if Iran is here to stay, and we believe that its aims are malignant, it seems to me that his only answers are either war or continued irregular operations by Israel. It's certainly a possibility. I think most of the other participants have a slightly different view, and Ambassador Ettinger might be correct that they are naive, but I did listen to him very carefully. I heard the defense of the JCPOA years ago from various Americans. Very few people embraced it. They just thought it was the least worst possibility and that was certainly my view. It was interesting that Mr. Rosen, who had been a prisoner of the Iranians, was quick to blame President Trump as well. I would not make the mistake, and I think Ambassador Ettinger is right. I don't think there is any moral

equivalence between Trump, as horrendous as he is in my view, and his sort of idiosyncratic actions on one hand and the sustained activity of the Iranian's. That would be a mistake to equate them. Now, I think that what we are stuck with is this: I think Iran and its people are here to stay, and the U.S. has to determine what's in our security interest. To suggest that it is merely war or irregular Israeli activities, I just don't think that is a satisfactory way to go forward. But I would say that the discussion has been so excellent that I honestly don't know what the answer is, but I will step back. Thank you.

AUDIENCE QUESTION

In the news, there was a report that Iran and Argentina applied to join BRICS. Russia was very vital in the JCPOA deal that they mediated with Iran. So having these two facts, how does it affect the possible deal with Iran while there is, essentially, an attempt to isolate Russia?

AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT HUNTER

Russia and Putin, now, in terms of the standoff with us—and that's another subject for another day—clearly are looking for other things to do in the world, to regain some status as a major power, if not a great power and certainly, never again, as a superpower.

And that includes what Russia does in the Middle East, including in Syria. For example, even in Syria, as far as I know, the Russian Air Force and the United States Air Force have continued to exchange the data that's necessary so they don't shoot one another down.

But the Russians and Iranians are clearly engaged in some kind of dance here to see whether either of them, in its own interest, is able to use the relationship with the other for its own advantage.

We already know, of course, that Iran is exporting a good deal of its hydrocarbons to China. It won't have a need to import hydrocarbons from Russia, but it could want to import other kinds of things, but then of course this has gone back and forth for decades.

Thus, one has to think about what Russia will be up to elsewhere in the world and in the Middle East, which requires looking beyond the narrow perspective we've been considering here.

PROFESSOR GAWDAT BAHGAT

If I may, as I said before, the United States is not withdrawing from the Middle East, but also, at one point, the United States was the dominant power in the Middle East. This is no longer the case. There is some kind of competition between the United States, China, and Russia, and in the United States, we are evaluating this competition and how we can get our allies to keep working with us. Not only Arab countries, but also Israel.

Many American diplomats talk to their Israeli counterparts about China and building a naval presence in Haifa. We are also talking to our Arab allies about China building information technology infrastructure competing with American companies. This competition is very important and there is a perception, rightly or wrongly, that there is a 'new world order.'

This 'new world order' means the United States is not the only superpower; there are other players. China is the main trade partner to many countries including in the Middle East. And, the United States still is the main security partner, but probably, some countries will reconsider their policy. Should they keep the United States as their main security partner and China as their main trade partner? The point that I'm trying to make here is that there is a perception—rightly or wrongly—that there is an emerging 'new world order' where the United States is not the only global power. For China and Russia, much will depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT HUNTER

I have three points. First, the JCPOA trammled the Iranian nuclear weapons program, at least for a period of time. Going away from it, refusing to rejoin the JCPOA, merely has advanced the chances of an Iranian bomb.

The Israeli government worked very hard for that situation, and the whole world may be forced to live with that: that unless we are lucky, the Iranians and the Israelis could be giving us a nuclear Iran. That's a fact, the intervention in United States politics. We live with it every day. That's number one.

Number two. In terms of negotiating with the Iranians, I want to quote something: "You don't make peace with friends. You'll make it with very unsavory enemies." That was Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated by an Israeli right-winger for wanting to make peace. Okay. That's not an American saying. That was a Prime Minister of Israel, a man I happened to have known and had the opportunity, at a lower level, to work with.

Number three, everybody in the Middle East has to understand that the United States is now looking, almost across the spectrum of Republicans and Democrats, less to the Middle East and more, from a global perspective and in terms of competition, toward the two big powers, China and Russia.

It's often said that you don't want to fight a two-front war. We have one front now with our war with Russia, even though it's done indirectly. Many Americans also believe that we are in a long-term "war" with China, and maybe they are right. But, you certainly don't want to fight a three-front war, meaning in the Middle East. Further, the ambition of most people in the United States foreign policy community, and certainly of the American people, is not to have any more wars in parts of the world where we don't have an interest directly at stake, or where we aren't being attacked. We don't want to get dragged into a war with anybody else in the Middle East, including Iran.

What's happening with regard to Iran is relatively small compared to Russia and China, and we'd like to get it behind us. If that means going forward with the JCPOA with controls over Iran, in terms of nuclear policy, and whatever else can work in the region, that's the direction the United States will be going. Despite all of the efforts being made to have us follow the desires and the policies of individual local states, it's changing.

As I said before, American support for Israel security is evergreen. That's not going to change. But there is a growing reluctance on the part of a lot of Americans, including a lot of Americans highly sympathetic to Israel, not to get dragged into a war with Iran.

PROFESSOR DON WALLACE

Yonah, I would like to thank you again for bringing together these very informed panelists. I think we have been exposed to some true and sufficient insights that most of us, and most of our listeners, will be able to form their own judgments. I want to thank you for that, Yonah, and thank everyone as well.

V. ABOUT THE EDITORS

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER is the Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies (at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies) and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (at the International Law Institute). He is a former Professor and Director of Terrorism Studies at the State University of New York and the George Washington University. Professor Alexander also held academic appointments elsewhere such as American, Catholic, Chicago, Columbia, and Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has published over 100 books and founded five international journals. His personal collections are housed at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University.

PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR. Yale University BA, Harvard University, LLB, is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University as well as Chairman of the International Law Institute. He is a U.S. delegate to UNCITRAL, Vice President of the UNIDROIT Foundation, a member of the American Law Institute, and the former chairman of the International Law Section at the American Bar Association. He is also the author and co-author of several books and articles.

VI. ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

BARRY ROSEN worked in Iran at the U.S. Embassy's Press Attaché, in 1979 with the Ambassador, Western and Iranian media. While he almost fell victim to an attempted mass murder of the U.S. Embassy by Islamist revolutionaries on February 14, 1979, only three days after the fall of the ancient regime. While the story of the "Hostage Crisis" is public knowledge, it's rarely understood intimately by someone like Barry Rosen who experienced 444 days of a country that went "wild." Beyond literally living in darkness and torture through mock executions and days and weeks of empty silence, Rosen and his colleagues suffered from emotional distress and a heightened sense of loss of self.

Since his release from captivity, Rosen went on to leave the Foreign Service and take up both teaching and administrative positions at his alma mater, Brooklyn College, as well as a decade with Teachers College, Columbia University, where he led the Afghan Education Project along with other educators in writing new primary school textbooks for Afghan boys and girls. Today, Barry's efforts are devoted to those dual-national hostages taken by Iran as part of its "Hostage Diplomacy." He advocates against the American negotiations with Iran over any possible resumption of a nuclear deal with Tehran unless it releases all its hostages. He took the dramatic step of traveling to Vienna in January and embarked on a hunger strike on behalf of the more than two dozen hostages now held by Iran. As he was sitting in front of headquarters where the negotiations were taking place, Barry told reporters that at age 78 he could no longer stand for the West's inexcusable reluctance to hold Iran accountable for its absolute violation of human rights.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) YORAM ETTINGER has accumulated over 40 year-experience as a researcher, diplomat, writer, lecturer and consultant to Israeli and U.S. legislators and their staffers. He is the President of "America-Israel Opportunities, Ltd", a consultancy on U.S. Mideast policy, U.S.- Israel relations and inter-Arab affairs. He is co-founder of the America-Israel Demographic Research Group, which has documented a 1 million gap in the number of Arabs in Judea & Samaria, refuting the myth of "Arab demographic time bomb" and documenting unprecedented Jewish demographic tailwind.

Yoram served as Minister for Congressional Affairs – with the rank of Ambassador – at Israel's Embassy in Washington, DC. (1989-1992); Director of Israel's Government Press Office, coordinating relations with overseas journalists (1988-1989); Israel's Consul General to the Southwestern USA, based in Houston, Texas (1985-1988); the editor of the "Contemporary Mideast Background," which was disseminated to thousands of policy-makers and public opinion molders in Hebrew, English, Spanish, French and German (1976-1985); Deputy Director of the U.S. Cultural Center in Jerusalem (1975-1976); information officer at Israel's Consulate General in Los Angeles (1971-1973); the Alabama Trade Representative in Israel (1997-2000). Yoram acquired his B.A. in Business Administration at the University of Texas, El Paso (1969), MS in International Management at UCLA (1971) and CPA certificate (1970).

PROFESSOR GAWDAT BAHGAT is a professor of national security at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) at the National Defense University. He is the author of 12 books on the Middle East and American foreign policy. His latest book is *Defending Iran from Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles*, published by Cambridge University Press in September 2021.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT E. HUNTER was the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO under President Clinton ('93-'98), and represented the U.S. to the Western European Union. He was the principal architect of the "New NATO", leading the North Atlantic Council in implementing decisions of the 1994 and 1997 NATO Summits. He served on Secretary Cohen's Defense Policy Board and was Vice Chairman of the Atlantic Treaty Association ('98-'01). During his extensive career in the public sector, he served as Special Advisor on Lebanon to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Lead Consultant to the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (the Kissinger Commission). During the Carter Administration, Ambassador Hunter served on the National Security Council staff as Director of West European Affairs ('77-'79), and later as Director of Middle East Affairs ('79-'81). He was a member of the U.S. negotiating team for talks on the West Bank and Gaza, directed the 1978 NATO Summit, and was the principal author of the Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. He also served as Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Edward M. Kennedy ('73-'77) and foreign and domestic policy advisor to Vice President Hubert Humphrey. He served on White House staff (health, education, welfare, labor) in the Johnson Administration ('64-'65) and in the Navy Department on the Polaris Project. Twice recipient of Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, decorated by Hungarian, Lithuanian and Polish governments, and received Leadership Award of the European Institute. He has written, lectured, and broadcast extensively on foreign affairs and national security issues.

PROFESSOR NATIVIDAD CARPINTERO-SANTAMARIA is a Professor of Energy Security at the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM) (Polytechnic University of Madrid); Department of Energy Engineering at the Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Industriales (ETSII) (Industrial Engineering College) / Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM) (Spain). 2)

General Secretary of the Instituto de Fusión Nuclear «Guillermo Velarde» (IFN GV) ETSII –UPM. 3) Member of the European Academy of Sciences (EURASC). 4) Member of the Commission for Energy and its Relationship with Security and Defense of the Center for National Defense Studies (CESEDEN). She has lectured and presented papers in several conferences around the world: Armenia, Australia, European Union, Middle East, Japan, Latin America, Russian Federation and the United States of America. Education: PhD Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM). 2) University Expert in Energy Markets. 3) Diploma in High Studies of Defense by the Centre for National Defense Studies (CESEDEN). 4) Diploma University Expert in Transnational Organized Crime and Security.

